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WHAT ONE CAN LEARN FROM FOREIGNLANGUAGE TRANSLATIONS OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
Sanford Levinson*
I. INTRODUCTION

There is much that could be said about the fascinating
discovery by Professor Mulligan and her colleagues of the Dutch
and German translations of the English text of the United States
1
Constitution drafted in Philadelphia in 1787. But, of course, that
draft consisted only of proposals; what was key was the
transmission shortly afterward to the citizenry at large for what
the first Federalist aptly described as their "reflection and
2
choice" about the new system proposed to replace what its
critics called the "imbecility" 3 of the polity established by the
Articles of Confederation. There are at least three different
perspectives from which one can mount one's own analysis of
the non-English language texts that are the subject of this essay. 4
First, one might simply look at their work- and,
particularly, the extremely interesting Appendix containing the
actual translations-from what might be termed a "micro-

* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at
Austin. As always, I am grateful to Jack Balkin for his comments on an earlier draft. I
also appreciate Jill Hasday's invitation to contrihute to this discussion.
I. Christina Mulligan, Michael Douma, Hans Lind & Brian Quinn, Founding Era
Translations ofthe Federal Constitution, 31 CoNST. COMMENT. I (2015).
2. FEDERALIST NO. I (Alexander Hamilton). See also SANH)RD LIVINSON, AN
ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING TJ/1~' FI~'J>I~'IU\USf'IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2015).
3. See, e.g., FEDERALIST No. l.S (Alexander Hamilton).
4. Although I initially typed "foreign language," it is, I think, essential to realize
that there is a very powerful, and perhaps untenahlc, assumption huilt into the
description of Dutch and German as "foreign language." As noted in the text, there were
many "good Americans" circa 17X7 for whom English was not their primary language,
contrary to Puhlius's assertions in Federalist 2. That English has turned out to he the
dominant language within the United States was perhaps predictahk, hut it surely was
not legally re4uired.
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perspective." We could concentrate on the subtle differences in
meaning that might be generated by the shift from English to
Dutch or German (and then back again into English by virtue of
translating from the Dutch or German). I well remember my
own experiment in this direction many years ago, when I asked a
law student at the University of Texas, who had been a
professional translator prior to his coming to law school, to
translate one of the commonly available French versions of the
U.S. Constitution without, of course, referring to the English
version.
A second possibility is to address some of the theoretical
issues posed by the notion of "translation" itself, particularly
with regard to the basis by which we assess the merits of any
given translation. Even those who are, unlike me, multilingual,
must nonetheless rely on translations much of the time in a
world whose multicultural reality becomes ever more important.
Almost by definition, we are at the tender rnercies of the
translator, the accuracy of whose work we really cannot truly
judge. A final perspective is provided by what might be termed
the "social history" aspect of their project, which emphasizes the
social and political reality, and presumed importance, of the
existence of German- and Dutch-speaking minorities in
Pennsylvania and New York at the time of the Constitution's
proposal and ratification. The United States was already a
"multi-cultural' or "multi-national" country, which raises
interesting questions with regard to at least some of the
theoretical underpinnings of the new nation taking form
following the secession from the British Empire. The reality of
such multiculturalism-especially when revealed in the presence
of languages other than English- has often generated either
denial or, when that is, as a practical matter, impossible, then
normative opposition. We will see at least the first reflected in
one of the most interesting essays of The Federalist and the latter
in the thought, interestingly enough, of one of our most
cosmopolitan "founders," Benjamin Franklin. I will discuss these
three perspectives in turn.
•

'i

5.
I am emharrassed to say that although I recall that it was very illuminating al
the lime lo sec what difference it might make if, in some hypothcticcd future, historians
trying lo reconstruct the U.S. Constitution had only a French-language text from which
lo work. I do not remcmhcr the specifics and was unahlc to find the translation in my
files. C'cslla vic!
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II. ON THE MICROANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE
Although this project may have interesting implications for
"originalists," explored in the accompanying essay by my friend
Jack Balkin, it also is of obvious relevance to those who describe
themselves as "textualists." For example, does it matter-or,
perhaps more to the point, exactly how and why does it matterif instead of the words "to keep and bear arms" in the Second
Amendment, we instead read only the words "to carry arms"? 6
This, of course, is not the only potentially interesting example
found in a careful perusal of the Appendix. Consider the
German translation of the "territories clause" of Article IV as
ostensibly giving Congress "the power to sell the land or other
property of the United States and for this to make the necessary
rules/orders and establishments"? 7 "[F]or this" seems to limit
congressional power of rule-making to a small subset of cases in
which the land is being sold either to private purchasers or,
perhaps, to a foreign country. To be sure, this raises a host of
questions: Is it really conceivable that Congress is without
power, say, to pass laws· organizing new territories that are
acquired by war or treaty or even the territories that are carved
out of existing states like Virginia or New York? Still, those who
profess to be serious textualists, like Justice Scalia or Harvard
Law Professor John Manning, often argue that they (or we more
generally) are bound by the dictionary meanings of language and
that we ought not to infer broader "purposes" that in effect
license judges and other interpreters simply to do whatever they
desire.~

These, of course, are not the only examples of interesting
problems that are generated by carefully reading the alternatives
presented by retranslating the German and Dutch back into
English. One might have a different conception of the Vice
President-whose office I have elsewhere analogized to the
duck-billed platypus because of the difficulty in assigning it to a
single species 9 - if we accept, with regard to the limitation that

6.
7.
X.

Mulligan, supra note I, at app., p. 56 (German translation).
!d. at 50.
See, e.g., Scalia's opinions in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 24XO, 2496-507 (2015);
NI~RB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 257X-61X (2014). See John F. Manning, The
Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663
(2004).
l).
See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS
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"[N]o Person holding any office" can "during his Continuance in
office" be at the same time a member of the House or Senate,
the proviso that the person in question must be someone who
"administers any office." 10 What "office" does the Vice President
"administer[]"? Is any official within the entire Executive
Branch, for example, under a duty to accept orders from the
Vice President? Contrast the Vice President not only with the
President- the Commander-in-Chief, after all- but also with the
Secretary of Transportation or even the Deputy Undersecretary
of the Bureau of Land Management in the Department of the
Interior. The sole duty of the Vice President, according to the
Constitution, is to be President of the Senate. The fact that
contemporary presidents may assign their vice-presidents certain
duties to chair committees or the like, arguably does not
translate into "administer[ing]" an office, unless we want to
argue that anyone who, say, hires a secretary or scheduler comes
within the Disqualification Clause. But is that a sensible reading
of the phrase?
Similarly, consider what difference it might 1nake, with
regard to the kinds of "germaneness" or "single--subject" rules
sometimes found in state constitutions and their structuring of
the legislative process, if Article I, Section 7 defined
"Amendments"
as
limited
to
"Improvements"
or
11
"Corrections." We have become used to the fact that the
Senate, especially, often proposes decidedly non-germane
amendments to bills that originate in the House. If we knew only
of the German translation, perhaps we would realize that all of
them are unconstitutional. Among other things, this would
presumably save us from the modern phenomenon of "omnibus
legislation," joining together in ungainly fashion hundreds of
pages relating to significantly different issues that a president is
forced to sign or veto in toto. Finally, consider the implications
of translating "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause as
12
"what the situation demands," especially if we view that as a
22X (20I2).
IO.
Mulligan, supra note I, at app., p. I4 (German translation).
II. !d. at app., p. IS (German translation).
I2. !d. at app., p. 2o (German translation). Though sec as well the commentary to
the Dutch translation. where the translation for "proper" ("hcquaam" in lXth century
Dutch spelling), means, in rctranslation, "competent, able, or capable." !d. Thus, "I f]or a
law to he 'noodig en hcquaam,' it would have to be necessary and c<tpable of achieving
the end it sought." !d.
AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE
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proper subject for judicial scrutiny. It is still not clear how that
differs from "necessary," unless, of course, one translates
"necessary" as Marshall did in McCulloch v. Maryland, to mean
13
"useful." In that case, it might make sense, as the authors
suggest, to view the German text as on to something in
"emphasiz[ing] that the power given is essentially restricted" by
the requirement that the objective situation, presumably open to
judicial review, "demands" the controversial measure.
All of these points are presumably interesting to anyone
who takes constitutional language with extreme seriousness,
including placing the language in a purportedly rigid historical
context. Those of us who are not sympathetic with the radical
rejection of purposivism -or embrace of originalism- found in
at least some iterations of textual argument as adopted in certain
opinions by Justice Scalia 14 or Chief Justice Roberts, 1:i though,
can wonder if anything would truly be different had all Englishlanguage texts disappeared on November 1, 1787, and we had
been forced to reconstruct the Philadelphians' handiwork by
translating the texts back from Dutch and German into English.
The only plausible response, obviously, is that we'll never know.
This is counter-factual history of truly science-fiction proportion.
Still, it would be interesting to know how those far more
sympathetic than I to originalism would respond to these
discoveries.

13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17U.S. 316,356 (lXlY).
14. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 24XO, 2505 (2015) ("The Court's decision
rclkcts the philosophy that judges should endure whatever intcrprt:tivc distortions it
takes in order to correct a supposed flaw in the statutory machinery").
15. See, e.g., Chief Justice Rohcrts' dissent in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
/ndep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677-Y2 (2015). Rohcrts, of course, had
written the majority opinion in Burwell, so it is fair to say that Rohcrts either has a more
nuanced (or incoherent) view of the power of textual commands than docs Scalia.
Though perhaps I should emphasize that I am a "hard-core textualist" with regard to
what I have taken to calling "the Constitution of Settlement" that is, alas, almost never
really taught within the legal academy precisely hecausc no interesting issues of
"interpretation" seem to he involved. On the dillcrencc hetwecn the "Constitution of
Conversation" and "Constitution of Settlement," See LEVINSON, supra, note Y, at lY. My
own stock example is Presidential Inauguration Day, whose deferral until January 20 I
think to he unfortunate and even at times dangerous, hut is, nonetheless, impervious to
clever lawyerly argument that a discredited incumhent is under the duty to make way for
his successor prior to that time. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
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III. ON ASSESSING TRANSLATION
Part of what is both interesting and amusing about this
project is precisely that we have the original English-language
texts by our sides, and we can use our presumed skill in that
language in assessing, or at least offering thoughtful
commentary, on the German or Dutch (or any other language,
presumably) versions. But this reality points to an important
theoretical issue with regard to the enterprise of '"translation"
and, more to the point, to our ability to assess the accuracy or
validity of any given proffered translation. Consider in this
context the arguments made by Larry Lessig that we should view
American constitutional law in general as a process of
"translation" from "original understandings" to later
16
understandings that pay due heed to changed circumstances.
The obvious problem is how we assess any given "translation."
How do we decide, for example, if the "New Deal Settlement"
represents the best way, in the 20th century, of reading the
Commerce Clause or, instead, represents what Ballkin and I have
described in a different context as "judges on a rampage" who
willfully ignore the limits of the text in favor of their own
political preferences? 17 As I put it some years ago, who actually
"needs" translations, with what implications? 1x The answer is
someone who has no access to an "original text," either because
it no longer exists or because the person seeking the translation
1
simply is incompetent to read and understand the original.
One can evaluate a given "translation," at least as to
"reliability" (as distinguished, say, from its stylistic appeal to
contemporary readers) if and only if there both exists a copy of
some authoritative ur-text to which we can refer and the person
assessing a given translation has sufficient facility in decoding
the meaning of the original text to be able to say that the later
interpreter was or was not faithful to its "true meaning." But if
all of the English-language texts of the Constitution disappeared,
l)

See, e.g., Lawn.:nce Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tr:x. L. RFV. 1165 (1YY3).
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of /,ooking at Dred Scott,
X2 CIII.-KENT L. REV. 4lJ, 7X-7Y (2007).
1X.
See Sanford Levinson, Translation: Who Needs It?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1457
(1lJlJ7).
1lJ. Jill Hasday has suggested that even someone competent in a foreign language
might nonetheless he interested in a translation partly to sec what another competent
reader said and partly, perhaps, in the hope that the alternative translation will prove
more felicitous with regard to how one hopes to interpret the text in question.
16.
17.
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for example, we would simply have no way of knowing whether
the German or Dutch versions were faithful to the original or
not. It would be like debates on the internal physiology of the
unicorn. There is simply no way of deciding whether unicorns
are ruminants or not.
Similarly, and just as importantly, if I myself cannot read
Dutch or German, as is most certainly the case, I have no basis
for praising or criticizing any "retranslation' of the Constitution
from one of those languages back into English. The phrase "it's
all Greek to me" presumably captures the sense of alienation
when looking at an alphabet that one cannot decode, let alone
the complex sentences built out of the strange looking phis, psis,
and omegas. I am a big fan of the Iliad, which I believe should be
read by every literate person. There are, needless to say, literally
dozens of competing translations; the first, by George Chapman,
provoked one of the most famous poems in the English
20
language. Nearer our own time, the reader can pick from wellreviewed versions by Robert Fagles, Richard Lattimore, Robert
Fitzgerald, and Stephen Mitchell, to name only four among
many others. 21 I have my own preferences, based in part of the
accessibility of the English text to a modern reader and the sheer
flow of the narrative. And some versions are more selfconsciously "poetic" than others. One reviewer writes of a 1987
translation by Martin Hammond that "[i]f I couldn't stand to
read another line of poetry but wanted to refresh my memory of
22
the story, Hammond's version would be my choice." What I
simply cannot do, though, is say that one of them is a more
"faithful rendering" of Homer than another. How in the world
would I know? The reason I rely on the translation is precisely
that I am illiterate in the original Greek (or, if truth be known, in
any other non-English language). One can, of course, look at

20. See John Keats, On First Looking into Chapman's Homer, POETRY
FotJNDATION, http://www.podryfoumlation.org/pocm/173746.
21. For comments ahout various translations, sec Douglas HofstaJtcr, What's
Gained
in
Translation,
N.Y.
Times
Book
Rev.
(Dec.
X,
1<.JY6),
https://www.nytimcs.com/hooksN7/07/20/rcvicws/hofstaJtcr-translati(m.html. See also
Daniel McnJclsohn, Englishing the Iliad: Grading Four Rival Translations, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 31, 2011 ), http://www.ncwyorkcr.com/hooks/pagc-turncr/cnglishing-thciliaJ-graJing-four-rival-translations.
22. Eric McMillan, The continuing story of Akhil!eus, EDITOR ERIC'S GREATEST
LITERATURE OF ALL TIME: THE WORKS (2013), http://www.cJitorcric.com/grcatlit/
translations/lliaJ.html.
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translations heuristically; no doubt readers fluent in Russian or
French may still be interested in translations of Tolstoy or
Proust, but, at the end of the day, they are in no serious sense
"relying" on them in the same way that I must. And, of course, a
common occurrence is that these fluent readers will spend most
of their time registering complaints about the inept translations
foisted upon them!
So the importance of the materials uncovered by Professor
Mulligan and her colleagues, however interesting, is decidedly
different from what it would be if, say, they had discovered the
Greek or Latin text of a hitherto unknown (or lost in antiquity)
Assyrian constitution, where there is simply no "original"
against which to measure the purported translation. Moreover, it
is probably worth adding, the almost certain commitments of
contemporary readers to particular interpretations of the
English-language constitution with which we are all familiar
makes it particularly unlikely that we would be budged by
whatever the Germans and Dutch translators (and then retranslators) had come up with. This is an "acadernic project" in
both the positive and somewhat pejorative senses of that term,
almost certainly unlikely to interest anyone not a practicing
academic.
IV. AMERICA AS A MULTI-LINGUAL SOCIETY
But enough of linguistic theory. Frankly, what I find most
truly important about these translations is their putting the lie to
a central aspect of one version America's founding myth. Begin
with the Declaration of Independence and its assertion that
there exists in British North America "one people" who can
secede from the British Empire and come together collectively
to exercise self-government as The United States of America. As
a matter of fact, one might say that the Articles of Confederation
themselves put the lie to that assertion insofar as the new
government was so weak, with "sovereign'' power specified to be
retained, by and large, in the constituent states. The amendment
rule set out in Article XIII, by requiring unanimity, also
underscored the extent to which it was indeed a confederation,
that is, a limited-purpose coming together of "sovereign" states
for specific purposes. Think of NATO or NAFf A in today's
world (or, perhaps, depending on one's degree of pessimism, the
European Union).
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The Constitution drafted in 1787 was something quite
different. It also spoke in the name of "We the People'' and, as
its opponents correctly pointed out, established a "consolidated"
system somewhat misleadingly described as "federal" that in fact
created an almost astonishingly more powerful national
government, with nary a mention in the text of anything about
"sovereign states." Indeed, Article V underscored the extent to
which a minority of states would have no choice at all about
accepting amendments that were accepted by three-quarters of
the states. No longer, as under the Articles, would a single state
(or even several states, so long as they were less than lA+ 1) be
able to veto changes thought desirable by three quarters of their
fellow members of the Union.
Why should one accept this new constitutional order?
Publius devoted The Federalist to exactly that question. And
Federalist 2 (written, for what it is worth, by John Jay) provided
a powerful answer:
It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent

America was not composed of detached and distant
territories, hut that one connected, fertile, widespreading
country was the portion of our western sons of liberty.
Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety
of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable
streams for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants.
A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round
its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble
rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present
them with highways for the easy communication of friendly
aids and the mutual transportation and exchange of their
23
various commodities.

Perhaps one finds this bucolic image persuasive. Surely I am not
the only person who has noted the dramatic difference in
landscape if one is flying over the eastern United States rather
than, say, travelling from Texas to Oregon. Such mountains as
exist east of the Mississippi are almost friendly, beckoning to the
traveler with their copious trees that extend to the very tops of
the mountains. No one who has seen the Rockies, let alone the
Alps, would confuse them with the Appalachians. And it is
surely unjust to expect Publius to be aware of the post-Louisiana
Purchase topography of the United States, when the distinctly

n.

FEDERALIST No.2 a to (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter cd., I Y61 ).
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more forbidding Rocky Mountains will become part of the
American landscape. But then we come to his next paragraph,
about which we can and should be less generous:
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected
country to one united people-a people descended from the
same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the
same religion, attached to the same principles of government,
very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their
joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side
throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established
24
general liberty and independence (emphasis added).

This entire sentence is preposterous, though I have emphasized
only the clause of greatest relevance to the project that is our
topic. After all, we are told very early on, by way of explaining
the existence of these very interesting translations, that in late
September 1787, "'around 1/3 of the population of Pennsylvania
25
primarily spoke German." Similarly, "in the late 1700s, the
Dutch language was still spoken widely in New York, specifically
in the rural areas around New York City .... " 2 Surely Publius
was aware of this; if we drop the nom de plume and ask about
the historical figure John Jay, it defies belief that this son of New
York was unfamiliar with the presence of Dutch speakers. One
might not be surprised if he were ignorant, for example, of the
fact that Georgia was settled not only by Englishman, but also by
"Welsh, Scots Highlanders, Germans, Italians, Piedmontese, and
27
Swiss," at least some of whom, for all I know, might have
continued to speak their native languages even while considering
the merits of the newly proposed Constitution. But it would be
astonishing if he were unaware of basic aspects of New York
social reality and, to say the least, also more than somewhat
surprising if he were ignorant of Benjamin Franklin's decided
unhappiness at the multitude of German speakers 1n
. 2i'
Pennsy Ivama.
(1

24. /d.
25. Mulligan, supra note I, at 4.
26.
/d.
27.
INFOPI"EASI ,
Georgia, http://www.infoplcase.com/encydopcdia/us/gcorgiastatc-unitcd-states-history.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).
2K. '"Few of their children in the country learn English,"' Franklin complained.
"'The signs in our streets have inscriptions in hoth languages ... Unless the stream of
their importation could he turned they will soon so outnumher us that all the advantages
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The United States Constitution refrains from adopting an
"official language," but Franklin for one might have been much
happier if we had emulated the French in adopting one. Why
didn't we? One possibility is that it was quite clear that English
would dominate the economic and social marketplace and would
inevitably win out in any competition. So why ruffle feathers by
underscoring this reality and in effect officially marginalizing a
fairly sizable number of one's fellow citizens, whose votes one
would need for the project of ratification, by labeling "unAmerican" their native language? Another possibility, of course,
is that one might find this linguistic pluralism, like other aspects
of our pluralism that 1ay seems eager to ignore in Federalist 2, to
be a positive advantage, a feature and not a bug, in
contemporary parlance. In any event, it should be clear that the
notion of a singular American "people" defined in terms other
than the sheer contingency that they live within a geographically
bounded territory, was then, and remains today, a subject of
debate. 2
l)

No one familiar with the full panoply of the RS essays that
compromise The Federalist could possibly believe that Publius
always speaks in a consistent voice. And this would no doubt be
true even were Publius in fact a single person; it is no easy
matter to maintain consistency even in a single essay (or judicial
opinion), let alone over a wide array written at different times
and, in the case of both Federalist essays and judicial opinions,
responding to different concrete realities with regard to the
audiences one hopes to reach.
So the question becomes why did 1ay feel it incumbent to
offer such a demonstrably wrong portrait of the "people" in
whose name the Constitution was ordained? In many ways, the

we have will not he able to preserve our language, and even our government will become
precarious."' Quoted in Kenneth Davis, The Founding Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
2007, htlp://www.nytimcs.com/2007/07/03/opinion/03davis.html. Or, as he put it in his
"Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind," htlp://www.archivc.org/strcam/
incrcascmankindOOfranrich/incrcascmankindOot'ranrich_djvu.txt,
"why
should
the
Palatine Boors he suffered to swarm into our scllkmcnts, and hy herding together
establish their languages and manners to the exclusion of ours? Why should
Pennsylvania, founded hy the English, become a colony of Aliens, who will shortly he so
numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our
language or customs, any more than they can acquire our complexion?"
29. See, e.g., BERNARDY ACK, NATIONALISM AND THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
COMMUNITY (2012).
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answer may really be quite simple: Whatever may be the reality
of 21st century American politics and culture, he clearly believed
there was nothing to be gained by underscoring the extent to
which we were, even then, distinctly multi-cultural and -national,
with attendant challenges for a polity that claimed to consist of
only "one people." The political philosopher most often cited in
The Federalist is not John Locke, but, rather, Montesquieu. To
be sure, many of the citations have to do with his views on the
importance of separation of powers, but it is also the case that
the French philosopher was both a source and a foil for Publian
ideas. After all, he is very well known as a philosopher of
republican government- which, of course, the Constitution
guarantees to each state in Article IV and, one presumes, is the
motif of the overarching constitutional order itself. What are the
preconditions for republican governance? A.ccording to
Montesquieu, they are, basically, the size and the hon1ogeneity of
the polity. That is, a republic should be relatively small; part of
the reason is that it should also be relatively homogeneous,
consisting indeed of a singular people comrnitted to selfgovernment.
It is obvious that no defender of the Constitution could
possibly accept the strictures on size; both Madison and
Hamilton, in several of their Publian essays, explicitly defend
30
what has come to be called the "extended republic." But Jay
seems to be accepting the argument that even if extension is
possible, it will be successful only if homogeneity remains. That,
after all, is just what it means to be "one united people," and he
goes on to spell out, albeit misleadingly, all of the ways that we
are united. To accept that a country extending, in 1787, from
what is now Maine to the southern border of Georgia and then
west to the eastern bank of the Mississippi was in fundamental
respects not united around anything other than an abstract
commitment to the Constitution, Jay may well have believed,
would be to condemn the entire consolidationist enterprise.
After all, as the anti-Federalist Agrippa wrote on December 3,
1787, "It is impossible for one code of laws to suit Georgia and
Massachusetts .... The idea of an uncompounded republic, on
an average one thousand miles in length, and eight hundred in

]0. See FEDERALIST No. li (Alexander Hamilton); FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 14
(James Madison).
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width~

and containing six millions of white inhabitants~ all
reduced to the same standard of morals~ or habits~ and of laws~ is
itself an absurdity." 31
What would reduce the absurdity is to claim exactly what
Publius/Jay did in Federalist 2. Perhaps one wants to argue that
the differences in language are in fact relatively unimportant.
Perhaps that is true~ in comparison~ say~ to the differences in
religious beliefs and commitments that Publius also freely
ignores in his zeal to describe a homogeneous people (who will
presumably be eager to support a consolidated national
government). Thus~ we discover that even the Dutch community
in New York was divided into "two warring factions within the
Reformed Church~" though it is unclear whether the wars over
church doctrine translated into substantive political views on the
merits of the new Constitution. The central point, though~ is that
the Publius of Federalist 2 was basically in deathly fear of
heterogeneity. It is hard to know which is worse, the prospect
that he was actively lying~ i.e.~ saying things that he knew to be
untrue~ or~ instead~ that his fears generated a massive case of
denial.
However~ as already suggested~ what is fascinating about the
various essays of Publius is that one can find alternative views of
homogeneity and heterogeneity~ so that the "extended republic"
is not simply larger than the Italian city states or Geneva~ but
also blessedly more heterogeneous. Is this not the principal
theme of what is probably the best known essay, Federalist 10~ in
which Publius/Madison expresses extremely deep fears about the
political sociology of small states~ including his own state of
Virginia? That is~ it turns out to be the case that no state~
however small~ is truly homogeneous. They are all divided by
reference to a number of different factors, and these inevitable
differences~ "sown in the nature of man~" according to Publius~
32
constitute the "latent causes of faction" that so concern him.
Factions, which he defines as the propensity to prefer one's own
interest over the common good, can be seen "everywhere~"

31. Agrippa, quoted in JAMES MCCLELLAN, LIBERTY, ORDER, AND JUSTICE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 01· AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
(1l.lXl.l),h ttp://oll .li bert yfund.org/ti tks/mcck llan-li bert y-ordcr-a nd-j ustice '! q= It+ is+
impossihk+f<lr+one+code+of+laws+t<Hsuit+Georgia+and+Massachusetts#McCkllan_OO
XX_132n.
32. FEDERALIST No. 10 at 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1% I).
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brought into different degrees of activity, according to the
different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different
opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and
many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an
attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for
pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions
whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions,
have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more
disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co--operate for
their common good .... But the most common and durable
source of factions has been the various and unequal
distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are
without property have ever formed distinct interests in
.
]]
SOCiety.

As is well known, Publius sees no way of eliminating faction
without eliminating liberty itself. However, the consequences
can be limited precisely by accepting the exte1t1ded republic,
which has the virtue of weakening the power of any given faction
by creating a national political context within which a
multiplicity of factions must contend with one another. Unlike
the case in Virginia or any other state, no faction can genuinely
hope to establish supremacy; all must seek out alliances and
make compromises with groups they would prefer to crush if the
situation allowed.
Interestingly enough, Publius in Federalist 10 makes no
mention at all of the degree to which factions can organize
around language, though anyone familiar with politics today is
fully cognizant of the extent in many countries around the world
that linguistic issues are at least as important as some of the
other "sources of faction" that are outlined. We have not
escaped such tensions ourselves, of course; "English-only"
movements have been a staple of American politics at least for
most of the past half-century. As if corroborating the analysis set
out in Federalist 10, devotees of linguistic exclusivity have been
able to capture control of certain localities and even states, even
as federal law has seemingly taken greater cognizance of the fact
that English is only one of the languages spoken or understood
by "genuine Americans." Thus, a contemporary analogue of the
translations of the Constitution into German and Dutch may be

33.

/d.
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the preparation of voting materials in Spanish or Chinese, for
example, in certain parts of the country. But the recognition that
English is not our official language of government continues to
raise the hackles of some observers. Louisiana Governor Bobby
Jindal, one of the phalanx of those campaigning for the
Republican nomination for the presidency, chose in his first
television ad to emphasize not only that "[i]f folks want to
immigrate to America, they should do so legally. They should
adopt our values. They should learn English .... " 34
A distinctly more distinguished scholar, Samuel P.
Huntington, published in 2004 as his last book Who Are We? The
Challenges to America's National Identity that seemingly bought
hook, line, and sinker the analysis offered in Federalist 2. Thus,
wrote Huntington,
[t Jhe American people who achieved independence in the late
eighteenth
century
were
few
and
homogeneous:
overwhelmingly white (thanks to the exclusion of blacks and
Indians from citizenship), British, and Protestant, broadly
sharing a common culture, and overwhelmingly committed to
the political principles embodied in the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution, and other founding
35
documents.

Huntington despaired that this world was irredeemably lost. He
was especially concerned by the increasing multilingualism
generated primarily by the vast new numbers of Spanishspeaking immigrants, who he feared were far less likely to leave
their initial language than were Asians, another increasing part
of the American mosaic. After writing that "No society is
immortal," Huntington goes on to quote Rousseau: '"If Sparta
36
and Rome perished, what state can hope to endure forever?'"
Thus, Huntington suggested that we should not blithely assume
that even the post-Civil War United States would maintain itself
into the indefinite future. He explicitly rejected the wisdom of
relying only on what might be termed "constitutional
34. See James Hohmann, Jindal in his super PJ\Cs first ad: Immigrants 'should
adopt our values... learn English', WASH. POST: POST POLITICS (J unc 2tJ, 2015),
http://www.washingtonp(lst.com/news/post-politics/wpf2()J5/()6/2tJ/jindal-in-his-superpacs-first-ad-immigrants-should-adopt-our-valucslcarn-cnglish/ (which also contains a
link to his video).
35. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE'! THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S
NATIONAL IDENTITY I I (2004).
36.
!d.
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attachment," describing this as "the classic Enlightenmentbased, civic concept of a nation" in which "nationalism," lacking
any other commonalities, was predicated entirely on
37
commitment to abstract propositions. "History and psychology,
however, suggest that this is unlikely to be enough to sustain a
nation for long. ,,x Instead, he called for renewed emphasis on
the "core culture" that he believed dominated in 1787.
One of the virtues of what I will call the "translation
project," though, is to call into question what constituted even in
1787, and even only among white males, the "core culture." No
one could take seriously the assertion that Americans at the time
shared a single religion, but at least we might think that Publius
had gotten it right about it "speaking the same language." But
now we know that was wrong as well. But so what? Perhaps his
real mistake was not his altogether dubious reading of the
American social order, but, rather, his belief, certainly shared
with Franklin, that homogeneity really mattered. How might he
have responded, for example, had Quebec accepted the
invitation from American revolutionaries to join them as the
"Fourteenth Colony" seeking independence from1 Great Britain
39
in 1776. Quebec was as French speaking then- it had been
seized by the British only in 1763 as part of the Seven Year's
War-as it is now, and it would have been impossible to deny
the multilinguicity of a United States that included Quebec. For
better or, quite possibly, for worse, we did not have the
opportunity in 1787 to come to terms with a robust form of
heterogeneity that Quebec would have presented.
In any event, I trust it is clear that there is n1uch reason to
be grateful to Professor Mulligan and her associates.
Professional linguists, theorists of interpretation, and American
social historians all can benefit from their toiling in hitherto
unknown and unexamined vineyards.
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